Evaluating "competing" explanations in economic interdependence and war

Dale C. Copeland’s Economic Interdependence and War tackles head on one of the central debates in grand IR theory: whether and how economic interdependence between great powers affects the likelihood of war. With realist scholars arguing that interdependence is a source of vulnerability and a cause of conflict, and liberal scholars arguing that interdependence is a source of stability and a mitigator of conflict, IR’s main paradigms remain unable to fully account for both the massive amount of interdependence among great powers and the conflicts between them. Initially framing his book as a sort of middle ground, Copeland argues that the “impact [of interdependence] can cut both ways” and so we must shift the question to “when and under what conditions will the trade between nations lead to either peace or military conflict?” Copeland argues that the bifurcating factor is whether leaders have positive or negative expectations about their country’s future trade relationships: anticipation of continuity or prosperity should foster restraint, whereas anticipation of decline or cut-offs should prompt aggression